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ABSTRACT: Unsolicited bulk email (spam) nowadays accounts for nearly 75% of daily email traffic, a figure that speaks strongly for the 
need of finding better protection mechanisms against its dissemination. A clever trick recently exploited by email spammers in order to 
circumvent textual-based filters, involves obfuscation of black-listed words with visually equivalent text substitutions from non-alphabetic 
symbols, in such a way it still conveys the semantics of the original word to the human eye (e.g. masking viagra as v1@gr@ or as v-i-a-
g-r-a). In this paper we discuss how a simple-yet-effective adaptation of a classical algorithm for string matching may meet this stylish 
challenge to effectively reveal the similarity between genuine spam-trigger terms with their disguised alpha-numeric variants.
KEYWORDS: Uncovering of spam vocables, approximate string matching algorithm.
RESUMEN: El 75% del correo electrónico que se transmite hoy en día, corresponde a mensajes masivos no solicitados (comúnmente denominados 
spam), lo que evidencia la necesidad de continuar fortaleciendo los mecanismos de protección contra su propagación. Uno de los tretas más 
ingeniosas utilizadas últimamente por los spammers para sobrepasar los filtros basados en comparación de texto, es el enmascaramiento de las 
palabras vedadas mediante substituciones con símbolos no alfabéticos, de manera que aún visualmente logren transmitir la semántica del término 
original (por ejemplo, enmascarando viagra como v1@gr@ o como v-i-a-g-r-a). En este artículo se discute una técnica simple pero efectiva para 
contrarrestar esta sutil trampa, que consiste en la adaptación de un algoritmo reconocido de apareamiento de textos para revelar efectivamente la 
similitud existente entre vocablos desencadenadores de filtros spam y variantes alfanuméricas enmascaradas.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Desenmascaramiento de vocablos spam, algoritmo de apareamiento aproximado de texto.
1.  INTRODUCTION
Electronic mail (email) is nowadays one of the most popular 
communication mediums utilized to exchange information 
at a corporate or personal level. Indiscriminate abuse of 
the system has led to what is commonly known as spam: 
unsolicited bulk email intended to broadcast commercial 
advertisement free of charge or to mislead people to visit 
illegal or suspicious Web pages. This improper practice 
is a real burden to the operating cost of the system; 
according to Barracuda Central (www.barracudacentral.
org, last visited: 21-June-2013), a privately held company 
specialised in email traffic monitoring, almost 75% of 
an average 600M emails sent daily is spam. The topics 
of spam messages range from pharmaceutics to lotteries 
to replicas to illegal advertisement to pornography, just 
to name a few. These numbers reveal the magnitude of 
the problem, and although filters are becoming stronger 
in stopping spam [1-5], spammer’s efforts have likewise 
grown in sophistication.
One of the latest tactics involves masking filter-triggering 
words by substituting letters with visually equivalent non-
alphabetic symbols that are still easily recognized by the 
naked eye. Some examples of this type of masking are 
shown in Table 1. Such type of encoding is reminiscent 
of first-order (i.e. one symbol) internet slang ciphering 
largely popular in forums, instant and text messaging, and 
hacker’s newsboards (e.g. leet speak [6], chatspeak [7, 
8], text-talk [9]). Table 2 shows a non-exhaustive list of 
substitution ASCII-code symbols for the English alphabet. 
Several approaches have been proposed to tackle this 
masking manoeuvre; we discuss some of them below. 
Most of the many (combinatorial) non-alphabetical 
guises for a given spam term would be so infrequent 
that they would hardly appear in any filter’s black-list. 
Furthermore, maintaining a large black-list covering all 
the variants would be unfeasible. An obvious choice to 
account for the transliterations induced by Table 2 would 
be to perform an inverse mapping of each symbol in the Dyna 182, 2013 51
disguised word. Unfortunately, this is not a one-to-one 
mapping, making it difficult to find the set of rules that 
define the exact reversing. A more sophisticated option is 
to train a probabilistic generative model (for example, a 
Hidden Markov Model) of the genuine spam term and use 
it for recognising any of its variants (see [10, 11]). This 
technique chooses the hidden sequence of states -in this 
case insertion, substitution, deletion- that most probably 
explains the observed sequence of symbols of the spam 
term variation. The main disadvantage of these methods is 
the computational time required to train and use the models, 
despite recent optimisations alleviating this issue [12].
Table 1.  Examples of first-order substitution masking of 
the spam term “viagra”. Substitution site is underlined in 
the header row. (Viagra® is a trademark of Pfizer).
viagra viagra viagra viagra viagra viagra
uiagra v1agra vi@gra via9ra viag®a viagrá
úiagra vlagra viägra viaqra viagΩa viagræ
Table 2. A non-exhaustive substitution lists of extended-
ASCII symbols for the 26 letters of the English alphabet.
In this paper we take a different viewpoint and regard the 
masking trick as a word-to-word matching application, 
that is, the aim is to determine if the disguised and 
the genuine spam-trigger vocables coincide. Popular 
algorithms to compute string-to-string similarity are 
well-known [13-15]. These algorithms were the basis of 
subsequent applications in the field of molecular biology 
and bioinformatics, where they were adapted to align 
sequences of genomic or proteomic molecules from 
different organisms in order to compare their similarity 
[16, 17]. Motivated by the sequence alignment method, 
in the following we describe an application of the string-
to-string matching algorithm for the purposes of detecting 
cases of non-alphabetically disguised spam terms.
Notation. Lower-case boldface is used to denote character 
strings (e.g. a). Plain font symbols designate characters 
or scalar values (e.g.  ℜ ∈ n i, ).  Capital letters denote 
matrices or sets (e.g. D, A). Single subscripts indicate 
loci in a string and double subscripts indicate entries of a 
matrix. The null character is marked as ‘−’.
2.  METHOD
To begin with we recall the classical string-to-string 
matching algorithm proposed by Wagner and Fischer 
[15] (see Algorithm 1), which is a refined version of 
the Levenshtein [14] algorithm to compute the edit 
distance between two strings a and b with lengths n 
and m, respectively. The edit distance basically scores 
the edits (corrections) needed to transform one string 
into another, based on an edit cost function δ(∙,∙). Such 
a function defines the cost of insertion, deletion or 
substitution of two given symbols from the strings. 
Algorithm 1. String-to-string edit distance
Input: Strings a = (a1,…, an), b = (b1,…, bm), 
            Similarity function δ(∙,∙)
Output: D(i+1,j+1),the edit distance between a and b
1: D(1,1) = 0
2: for (i =1,…,n) do
         D(i+1,1) = D(i,1) + δ(ai, −)
3: for (j =1,…,m) do
         D(1, j+1) = D(1,j) + δ(−, bj)
4: for (i =1,…,n) do
           for (j =1,…,m) do
                  D(i+1,j+1) = min (D(i, j+1) + δ(ai, −),
                                           D(i+1, j) + δ(−, bj),
                                           D(i, j) + δ(ai, bj) )
The algorithm maintains a dissimilarity (distance) matrix 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( + × + ℜ ∈
m n D  where any entry D(i+1,j+1) holds the edit 
distance between the prefix substring a[1:i] and the prefix 
substring b[1:j]; the matrix is progressively filled with a 
dynamic programming procedure that reuses previously 
calculated distances between shorter substrings, until it 
gets to the full extent of the input strings. 
The computation of the matrix entries works as follows. 
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empty string would be stored in the first column and first 
row of D respectively. Hence the first loop of the algorithm 
fills up the first column of D with the number of deletions 
needed to transform the successive prefix substrings of 
a into an empty string. Similarly, the second loop fills 
up the first row with the number of insertions needed 
to build up the successive prefix substrings of b out of 
an empty string. The heart of the algorithm is the final 
double-nested loop that computes intermediate distances 
D(i+1,j+1) or edits needed to transform the substrings with 
prefix a[1:i] into that with prefix b[1:j]. This distance is found 
as the minimum of three quantities that reuse distances 
between shorter prefix substrings previously examined, 
namely the distance between a[1:i-1] and b[1:j]. plus the cost 
of deletion of symbol ai from a, the distance between a[1:i] 
and b[1:j-1] plus the cost of insertion of symbol bj into a, 
and lastly, the distance between a[1:i-1] and b[1:j-1] plus the 
cost of substitution of ai by bj in a. The cost of insertion, 
deletion and substitution is determined by the edit cost 
function  ℜ → × A A : δ  mentioned above,  A being the 
set of symbols from an admissible alphabet.
Let us come back now to our problem of interest. In order 
to reveal the obfuscated spam terms, we need to consider 
allowing substitutions of letters from the English alphabet 
with symbols from Table 2, plus the occasional deletion 
of one symbol or insertion of bogus ornament symbols 
disrupting the original term. Our idea is therefore to 
use Algorithm 1 with a carefully designed edit cost (or 
similarity) function capable of detecting the masking 
operations. For this purpose, let us first express the set of 
common bogus segmentation characters as:
β S = { ∙, *, ~, |, −, _, :, ; }.
Secondly, let  ∆ S  denote the set of admissible 
substitution symbols for a given character ∆ (including 
itself); this set is determined by the column of Table 2 
indexed by ∆ in the head row (e.g. for the letter ∆:= 
‘l’, Sl  = { 1, l, !, /, £, L}). Now, let us define the edit 
cost function δ (∙,∙) as:
The rationale of Equation (1) is two-fold. On the 
one hand, replacement of a normal character with an 
admissible non-alphabetical symbol, or the insertion 
of a bogus character separator, should be ignored, in 
other words treated as no-cost edits. On the other hand, 
insertions as well as deletions or else substitutions with 
non-admissible characters should be treated as actual 
corrections that incur a cost of one edit.
We observe that the combination of Algorithm 1 with 
Equation (1) leads to a plausible method to match a 
disguised vocable and its original term. As an example 
of the method’s operation, Table 3 shows how a perfect 
match is obtained for the similarity between the 
vocables “viagra” and “v.1.@.g.r.@”. 
Table 3. Resulting distance matrix D for the input strings 
a:= “viagra” and b:= “v.1.@.g.r.@” (left column 
and top row respectively) computed with Algorithm 1 
coupled with Equation (1). The final dissimilarity score 
D(7,12) = 0 indicates a perfect match.
The method would be capable of uncovering spam-
filter triggering terms by scanning the email subject 
or contents against a list of genuine previously-known 
black-words, i.e. a vocabulary of typical spam terms 
written in plain lowercase English (notice that capital 
letters are included in the admissible substitution sets, 
so messages in uppercase will be matched as well). 
This can be done as a pre-processing step during email 
filtering: instead of searching for vocables with any 
exact-match in the black-list, the filter may search 
for matches with zero or small edit distance to any 
of the entries in the black-list, using the method just 
described, thus uncovering their guises. 
3.  EXPERIMENTS 
We experimented with two different datasets as 
described below. The focus was in detecting variants 
of spam triggering vocables, since these are the main 
target intended by spammers to fool filters; thus we Dyna 182, 2013 53
did not design experiments regarding detection of 
non-spamming terms. For all of our experiments we 
developed scripts in Octave version 3.2.4 (code and 
datasets are available upon request).
3.1. Sanity test
In order to illustrate the potential feasibility of the 
method, we conducted a preliminary trial on a list of 
186 masked versions of the vocable “viagra”, that 
we extracted from the Cockeyed Web bulletin (see 
“There are 600,426,974,379,824,381,952 ways to spell 
Viagra” by R. Cockerham in: www.cockeyed.com/
lessons/viagra/viagra.html, last visited: 21-June-2013). 
As can be seen in the excerpt shown in Table 4, this 
test list includes instances of obfuscation caused by 
substitution, insertion, deletion and segmentation. In 
this experiment we scanned each entry in the list and 
compute its distance to the genuine spam term; then we 
use the resulting distance matrix to perform sequence 
alignment [13, 15]. The findings are described next. 
Table 4. An excerpt of the viagra test set.
Table 5. Histogram of edit distances of the masked 
spam term variants contained in the viagra dataset.
Table 6. The ten detected variants with distance equal to 
or greater than 2 in the in the viagra dataset (obfuscated 
on top of alignment to the genuine term).
The distribution of edit distances to the genuine word 
“viagra” on this test set is shown in Table 5. This 
results show that the algorithm matched perfectly 80% 
of the examined instances (150 variants). 
A closer inspection of the 10 cases with a distance equal 
to or greater than 2 is given in Table 6. It is worth noting 
that most of these cases are nevertheless correctly aligned 
to the genuine spam word (8 out of 10). The variant found 
with a highest distance of 3 (and wrong alignment as 
well) was “ViaVErga”, which in our opinion, would be 
hardly recognizable by the human eye as the intended 
spam word. In fact, this variant would convey a different 
semantic in a language like Spanish. From a practical 
point of view, a spam filter would define a low threshold 
in the similarity score computed with our method, for 
example a distance less than or equal to 2, to activate 
the blocking mechanism. Such a threshold would have 
obtained 99% sensitivity in this viagra test list.
3.2. Extended test
After validation of the sanity test, a broader experiment 
was conducted to further study the empirical behaviour 
of the described method. 
For this purpose we visited a number of spam-related 
web forums and gathered a list of 100 common spam-
filter triggering sentences. Then we built a dataset 
comprising 100 automatically generated obfuscated 
variants for each spam-trigger sentence with a 
corruption rate  1 0 ≤ ≤ p . Thus, a character ∆ in the 
sentence was kept unaltered with probability  p − 1
; otherwise with probability  4 p it was exposed to 
one of the following edits: substitution with one of its 
admissible characters of Table 2, random substitution 
with any other character, replication (insertion of up 
to 10 occurrences of the same character), or insertion 
of up to 5 bogus repeated characters from the list  β S . 
We remark that the random substitution edit operation 
introduces noise that is meant to have an adverse effect 
on our matching method. An excerpt of this spam-
obfuscated list is shown in Table 7. 
The performance of the method in this setting 
was estimated as follows. We generated datasets 
as explained above, for a range of values for
} 5 . 0 , 4 . 0 , 3 . 0 , 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 { ∈ p . One experiment was run 
for each dataset. Each of the hundred canonical spam 
sentences was compared against its hundred variants 
and the average edit distance 
100
1 } ˆ { = i i d  was recorded, 
where i denotes the index of the canonical sentence in 
the dataset. Then we summarized these results in the 
average distance histogram shown in Figure 1. Rojas-Galeano 54
Figure 1. Average distance histogram in the obfuscated 
datasets for different values of p.
We found that for small corruption rates ( } 2 . 0 , 1 . 0 { ∈ p ) 
the method recognised more than 90% of the obfuscated 
variants, obtaining an edit distance  2 ˆ ≤ i d  (see the darker 
bottom regions of the two leftmost bars in Figure 1). 
On the other hand, higher corruption rates required higher 
distance thresholds for a 90+% recognition success: 
3 ˆ ≤ i d  for } 4 . 0 , 3 . 0 { ∈ p , and  4 ˆ ≤ i d  for 5 . 0 = p . The 
latter is nonetheless noteworthy considering that the noise 
induced with such rate can achieve up to 12% of random 
substitutions, an obfuscation level that mostly loses its 
deception factor to the human eye, as it is exemplified in 
the rightmost column of Table 7. 
In this sense one would expect that in order to be effective 
the obfuscation tactic would be carried out by spammers 
using the lowest corruption rates. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting that if a threshold on the edit distance of  4 ˆ ≤ i d  
were defined to block a suspicious (candidate spam) 
sentence, the method would have obtained ≈97% accuracy 
in this test, regardless of corruption rate or sentence length.
Further evidence of the latter claim was given by the 
following analysis. We first measured the average 
length 
100
1 } ˆ { = i i l of the corrupted sentences, that is, the 
average number of characters of the one hundred 
variants generated per each sentence i. 
Next we computed the set of ratios 
i
i
l
d
ˆ
ˆ
 for each test list 
generated with different values of p. This ratio gives us 
an indication of the proportion of average edits needed 
to transform the variants to its canonical form, with 
respect to their average lengths. 
A surface plot of this measure with respect to the 
different values of p is displayed in Figure 2. This plot 
reveals that the five surfaces maintain a constant trend, 
which in turn indicates that the average number of 
corrections needed to recognise the spam variant stays 
at a constant proportion to the average length yielded 
by their respective corruption rates. 
Table 7. An excerpt of the spam-obfuscated test lists. Sentence index (identifier) within the list is indicated in brackets.Dyna 182, 2013 55
Figure 2. Trend chart of the ratio of average distance to average length in the obfuscated datasets for different values of p. 
Indices (identifiers) of the collected one hundred spam-triggering sentences are indicated on the horizontal axis.
It is interesting to note that for most sentences the 
proportion 
i i l d ˆ ˆ  not only remains constant irrespective 
of p, but also is typically smaller than 0.1 (that is, 
smaller than 10%). There are only four peaks showing a 
greater proportion, those corresponding to the 11th, 12th, 
29th and 99th sentences: s11:=“bukkake”, s12:=“call 
free”, s29:=“free access pass” and s99:=“xxx”. 
This fact is explained by the current difficulty posed 
to the method when distinguishing between bogus and 
legitimate character repetitions, a common feature in 
these four instances. Right now legitimate character 
repetitions are accounted as one edit; to see why, 
notice that the first occurrence of the repeated letter in 
the original term is matched by the algorithm against 
the repeated occurrences of the same character in the 
variant; the second (and subsequent) repetitions in 
the original term are thus accounted as one insertion 
yielding a cost of 1 according to Equation (1). As a 
consequence, for example in s29,  , that is,  4 1  
of the original length  . The above rationale can 
be extended to the other cases, s99 being particularly 
prominent due to its short length.
4.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The method we have just described is intended to 
counter-attack the clever trick of ciphering spam-
trigger words with spurious character obfuscation 
aimed at fooling spam filters. The core of this method 
is the edit cost function −Equation (1)− which is 
plugged into a classical string matching algorithm. 
Such function in fact establishes an equivalence class 
for the admissible substitutions and segmentators in 
the masking character universe defined in Table 2 
augmented with the segmentation characters of the 
set β S . 
It is worth noting that the method requires no training 
before use; it only needs as input a cleaned (canonical) 
vocabulary list of spam trigger terms. We believe it 
could be valuable if used as a pre-processing step to 
uncover obfuscated text inside the contents of an email, 
in order to subsequently verify the rectified content 
using the current available and emerging spam-filter 
technology (as those described in [18] and [19]). It 
would be also interesting to refine the algorithm with 
sophisticated string-matching kernel machines so as to 
incorporate it into state-of-the-art spam filters (some 
examples in this direction are proposed in [20]).
We would like to conclude emphasizing on a few 
challenges concerning special cases of spam text 
obfuscation, currently not solved in the proposed method. 
The first one is the discrimination between obfuscation 
and genuine letter replication as discussed before 
(for example when masking call free►calllll 
freeeeee, only the first two “ll” and “ee” should be 
accounted as legitimate in the obfuscated sentence). In 
this regard, at present the algorithm is unable to match 
spurious repetitions with legitimate doubled-letter 
words. The second one, a challenge that may pose 
difficulties on body text parsing, is the discrimination 
of the blank space, which is not only the most common 
interword separator but also can be used for visually-
undetected letter segmentation (e.g. sex►s e x). 
Yet one more compelling challenge is the transposition 
of consecutive letters (e.g. password ►passwrod), 
even though the visual deception factor of this tactic Rojas-Galeano 56
is moderate and thus its prevalence is uncommon. In 
a different direction, worthy of attention, is the study 
of the method when allowing real-valued costs for the 
edit operations, to see how they effectively contribute 
to solve the obfuscation tactic.
As a final note, equally appealing are practical issues 
regarding hardware implementation of the described 
techniques, such as the study conducted in [21] and 
potential applications in other obfuscation-prone 
user-generated content such as text messaging and 
social networks posts. We remark that any application 
comprising processing of natural written text such 
as dialog human-machine-interaction [22], text 
morphological analysis [23], or speech synthesis 
from textual input [24], could benefit from the method 
described here, as it may increase their robustness rates 
to spelling mistakes.
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